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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

N0. 46946-2019

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

V.

)

Ada County Case No.

)

CR01-18—40837

)

JAMES McKINLEY MARSHALL,

)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

IS SUE

Has Marshall

failed to

show

the district court abused

its

sentencing discretion?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

state

charged James M. Marshall With possession 0f a controlled substance and

possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.24-25.)

guilty t0 possession of a controlled substance

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Marshall pled

and the

state

dismissed the possession of drug

paraphernalia charge. (R., pp.26-35.) The district court sentenced Marshall to a uniﬁed term 0f
six years with

one year ﬁxed.

(R., pp.44-45.)

Marshall timely appealed. (R., pp.47-49.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When

evaluating Whether a sentence

is

excessive, the court considers the entire length of

the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.

State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d

621, 628 (2016); State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).

ARGUMENT
Marshall Has Failed T0

The

district court

Show That The

did not abuse

years With one year ﬁxed.

It is

its

District

Court Abused

discretion

presumed

that the

when

it

Its

Sentencing Discretion

imposed a uniﬁed sentence 0f

ﬁxed portion of

six

the sentence will be the

defendant’s probable term 0f conﬁnement. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391

Where

(2007).

a sentence

demonstrating that

it is

(citations omitted).

To

sentence

is

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 0f

a clear abuse of discretion.

facts.

Li.

differing weights

The

show

at 8,

the sentence

is

368 P.3d

at

628

excessive under

Li.

reasonable if

it

appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective 0f

protecting society and to achieve any or

retribution.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

carry this burden the appellant must

any reasonable View 0f the

A

is

district court

all

0f the related goals 0f deterrence, rehabilitation, or

has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them

When deciding upon the

sentence. Li. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State V. Moore, 131

Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion in

concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection 0f society outweighed the

need for

rehabilitation).

“In deference t0 the

trial

judge, this Court Will not substitute

a reasonable sentence Where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

2

its

8,

View of

368 P.3d

at

628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho

ﬁxed within
discretion

by

the limits prescribed

the trial court.”

148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).

at

by

Furthermore, “[a] sentence

the statute Will ordinarily not be considered an abuse 0f

Li. (qu0ting State V. Nice,

103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324

(1982)).

Marshall “does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.4.)

show

Thus, as Marshall acknowledges, “in order t0 show an abuse 0f discretion, [he] must

that in light

of the governing

the facts.” (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

As
a

criteria, the

He

cannot d0

the district court observed, this

number of misdemeanor

convictions.

was excessive considering any View 0f

sentence

so.

was Marshall’s

sixth felony conviction

His criminal history includes a

(Tr., p.23, Ls.7-11.)

ﬂ

burglary conviction and a conviction for stealing a vehicle. (PSI, pp.5-6;

It

also includes

numerous drug convictions.

(PSI, pp.7—9;

ﬂ

its

Given

sentencing discretion

sentenced him t0 a uniﬁed sentence of six years With only one year ﬁxed.

it

Marshall erroneously argues that the

it

T11, p.23, Ls. 12-16.)

TL, p.25, Ls.5-19.)

Marshall’s extensive criminal history, the district court did not abuse

When

and he has had

district court

abused

its

sentencing discretion because

did not give Marshall a lesser sentence in light of his rehabilitative potential, history of substance

abuse,

good employment history, and remorse and acceptance ofresponsibility. (Appellant’s brief,

pp.4-6.)

First, the district

court considered Marshall’s rehabilitative potential in fashioning his

sentence:

You have

willing to support you.

You have

You have

Who are
You need to get out of this stuff if you want t0 make a better

things going for you.

a spouse.

people

life for yourself.

You have got the skills. You’ve been in treatment before. It’s a question of using
it. You can have all 0f the tools in the world, but if you don’t take them out of the
little plastic containers that those tools come in, you are not going t0 [] build much
out of them. And I kinda think that this is that sort of case.

(Tr., p.25, Ls.9-19.) In fact, the district court expressly stated that it only gave Marshall one year
fixed so that he could “qualify into a work center type program without too much delay” and to
give him “a chance to earn more quickly [his] way out.” (Tr., p.24, L.20 – p.25, L.25.) Marshall’s
rehabilitative potential did not require a shorter sentence than the sentence imposed.
Second, the district court considered Marshall’s history of substance abuse. Specifically,
the district court observed that Marshall had already had an opportunity to treat his substance abuse
when he was “in a one-year treatment program in Connecticut and in a residential treatment
program in California.”

(Tr., p.23, Ls.23-25.)

Marshall’s repeated failures in treating his

substance abuse weighed against a lesser sentence. (Tr., p.23, L.25 – p.24, L.2.) Thus, the district
court considered Marshall’s substance abuse problem and determined that, based on the specific
facts of Marshall’s case, his history of substance abuse did not merit a lesser sentence than the
sentence imposed. That is not an abuse of discretion.
Third, the district court considered Marshall’s work history and employment skills. As
explained above, the district court recognized that Marshall “ha[s] . . . the skills” to be successful
and tried to fashion a sentence—with a short fixed period—that would allow him to “qualify into
a work center type program without too much delay.” (Tr., p.24, L.20 – p.25, L.25.) Marshall’s
work history did not require a shorter sentence, especially given that employment does not keep
Marshall out of trouble: he was supposedly employed “when he was arrested for the instant
offense.” (PSI, p.13.)
Fourth, the district court considered Marshall’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility.
For example, in discussing the sentence it would impose, the district court noted that Marshall
“took responsibility” for the methamphetamine in his car. (Tr., p.23, Ls.17-20.) Nothing about

4

Marshall’s remorse or acceptance of responsibility required the district court to give Marshall a
sentence shorter than the sentence imposed.
In

short,

the

district

rehabilitative potential, history

court

weighed the appropriate

factors,

including Marshall’s

of substance abuse, good employment history, and remorse and

acceptance of responsibility, in deciding What sentence t0 impose. In light of Marshall’s lengthy
criminal history, the district court did not abuse

sentencing discretion

its

When it imposed a uniﬁed

sentence 0f six years with one year ﬁxed.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s judgment

0f conviction.

17th day of September, 2019.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

copy of the foregoing
iCourt File and Serve:
correct

that

I

have

this 17th

day of September, 2019, served a true and
to the attorney listed below by means of

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

